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Abstract—Malicious software (malware) is a major cyber
threat that shall be tackled with Machine Learning (ML) tech-
niques because millions of new malware examples are injected
into cyberspace on a daily basis. However, ML is known to be
vulnerable to attacks known as adversarial examples. In this SoK
paper, we systematize the field of Adversarial Malware Detection
(AMD) through the lens of a unified framework of assumptions,
attacks, defenses and security properties. This not only guides us
to map attacks and defenses into some partial order structures,
but also allows us to clearly describe the attack-defense arms race
in the AMD context. In addition to manually drawing insights, we
also propose using ML to draw insights from the systematized
representation of the literature. Examples of the insights are:
knowing the defender’s feature set is critical to the attacker’s
success; attack tactic (as a core part of the threat model) largely
determines what security property of a malware detector can be
broke; there is currently no silver bullet defense against evasion
attacks or poisoning attacks; defense tactic largely determines
what security properties can be achieved by a malware detector;
knowing attacker’s manipulation set is critical to defender’s
success; ML is an effective method for insights learning in SoK
studies. These insights shed light on future research directions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware (malicious software) is a big cyber threat and has
received a due amount of attention. For example, Kasper-
sky reports that malware attacked 2,871,965 devices in year
2016, 1,126,701 in 2017, and 830,135 in 2018 [1], [2]. A
popular defense against malware is to use signature-based
detectors [3], where a signature is often extracted by malware
analysts from known malware examples. This approach has
two drawbacks: signatures are tedious to extract and can
be evaded [4] by a range of techniques (e.g., encryption,
repacking, polymorphism [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]).
The incompetence of this approach has motivated the use of
Machine Learning (ML) based malware detectors, which can
be automated at some extent and can possibly detect new
malware examples (via model generalization or knowledge
adaptation [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20],
[21], [22], [23], [24]). More recently, Deep Learning (DL) has
been used for malware detection (see, e.g., [25], [26], [27]).
While promising, ML-based malware detectors are vulnera-
ble to attacks known as adversarial examples [28], [29], [30].
There are two kinds of attacks. One is evasion attack, where
the attacker perturbs test examples to adversarial examples
to evade malware detectors [31], [32], [28], [33], [17], [34],
[35], [36], [37]. The other is poisoning attack, where the
attacker manipulates the training data for learning malware
detectors [38], [39], [40]. These attacks usher in the new field
of Adversarial Malware Detection (AMD) [41], [42], [36],
[28], [29], [43], [44], [37], [32], [39], [40].
The state-of-the-art in AMD is that there are some specific
results scattered in the literature but there is no systematic un-
derstanding. This is true despite that there have been attempts
at systematizing the related field of Adversarial Machine
Learning (AML) [45], [30], [46], [47], which however cannot
be automatically translated to AMD because malware detec-
tion has three unique characteristics that are not possessed
by other domains, such as image or audio processing. (i)
There is no common, standard feature definitions because both
attacker and defender can define their own features to represent
computer files. This “freedom” in feature definition can be
leveraged by the attacker to craft adversarial examples, which
can be hard to detect. (ii) Malware features are often discrete
rather than continuous and program files are often highly
structured (e.g. Windows PE [48]). This means that arbitrarily
perturbing malware files or their feature representations might
make the perturbed files no more executable or malicious. This
also means that the discrete domain makes perturbations a non-
differentiable and non-convex task. For example, the Android
Package file requires that the used permissions be publicized in
the AndroidManifest.xml, meaning that removing a permission
in the manifest file would incur a runtime error. (iii) Any
meaningful perturbation to a malware example or its feature
representation must preserve its malicious functionality. The
preceding (ii) and (iii) make both the attacker’s and defender’s
tasks more challenging than their image and video counterparts
for which small perturbations would not be noticeable.
Our Contributions. We propose a framework for systematiz-
ing the AMD field through the lens of assumptions, attacks,
defenses and security properties. The framework allows us to
map known attacks and defenses into some partial order struc-
tures and systematize the AMD attack-defense arms race. We
manually draw a number of insights, including: (i) untargeted
attack is much more extensively investigated than targeted
and frustration attacks; (ii) evasion attack has been much
more extensively studied than poisoning attack; (iii) a certain
assumption, which will be defined later, is widely made;
(iv) knowing defender’s feature set is critical to attacker’s
success, highlighting the importance of (e.g.) randomizing
defender’s features; (v) defensive studies have mainly focused
on black-box defenses and defending against evasion attacks;
(vi) there is currently no silver bullet defense against evasion
attacks or poisoning attacks; (vii) AMD security properties
have been evaluated empirically rather than rigorously; (viii)
sanitizing adversarial examples is effective against black-box
and grey-box attacks, but not white-box attacks. In addition,
we propose using ML to draw insights from the systematized
representation of AMD attacks and defenses. This leads to new
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insights that we could not draw manually, such as: (ix) attack
tactic (as a core part of the threat model) largely determines
what security property of a malware detector can be broke; (x)
defense tactic largely determines what security properties can
be achieved by a malware detector; (xi) knowing attacker’s
manipulation set is critical to defender’s success, highlighting
importance of knowing your enemy; (xii) ML is an effective
method for insights learning in SoK studies. We also outline
a number of future research directions.
Related Work. The closely related prior study is Maiorca
et al. [49], which surveys previous studies in adversarial
malicious PDF documents detection by inheriting an earlier
attack framework introduced in AML context [45], [50], [51].
In contrast, we consider the broader context of AMD and pro-
pose novel partial orders to accommodate AMD assumptions,
attacks, defenses and properties. There are loosely-related
prior studies, which systematize or survey prior AML studies
(but not focusing on AMD), including [47], [45], [50], [52],
[53], [54], [46], [55]. For example, Yuan et al. [47] survey
attack methods for generating adversarial examples, while
briefly discussing evasion attacks in AMD context; Barreno et
al. [45], [50] propose a taxonomy of AML attacks (causative
vs. exploratory attacks, integrity vs. availability attacks, and
targeted vs. indiscriminate attacks); Biggio et al. [53] propose
a defense framework for protecting Support Vector Machines
(SVMs) from evasion attacks, poisoning attacks and privacy
violations; Papernot et al. [54] systematize AML security and
privacy with emphasis on demonstrating the trade-off between
detection accuracy and robustness.
Paper Outline. Section II describes our framework. Section III
uses our framework to systematizing literature AMD studies.
Section IV discusses future research directions. Section V
concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEMATIZATION FRAMEWORK
Terminology, Scope and Notations. In the context AMD, a
defender D aims to use ML to detect or classify computer
files as benign or malicious; i.e., we focus on binary classifi-
cation. An attacker A attempts to make malicious files evade
D’s detection by exploiting adversarial files (interchangeably,
adversarial examples). A file, benign and malicious alike, is
adversarial if it is intentionally crafted to (help malicious files)
evade D’s detection, and non-adversarial otherwise. We focus
on D using supervised learning to detect malicious files, which
may be adversarial or non-adversarial because they co-exist in
the real world with no self-identification. This means that we
do not consider the large body of malware detection literature
that does not cope with AMD, which has been addressed
elsewhere (e.g., [56]). Table I summaries the main notations
used in the paper.
A. Brief Review on ML-based Malware Detection
Let Z be the example space of benign/malicious
adversarial/non-adversarial files. Let Y = {+,−} be the label
space of binary classification, where + (−) means a file is
TABLE I: Main notations used in the paper
Notation Meaning
R (R+) the set of (positive) real numbers
A,D attacker and defender (treated as algorithms)
P the probability function
z, z′ ∈ Z Z is example space; z′ is obtained by perturbing z
S defender D’s feature set for representing files
x,x′ ∈ X X = Rd is feature space; x,x′ ∈ X are respectively
feature representations of z, z′ ∈ Z
Y = {+,−}, y Y is the label space of binary classification; y ∈ Y
I = Z × Y the file-label (i.e., example-label) space
Itrain ⊂ I, n the training set in file-label space; n = |Itrain|
Itest the test set in file-label space
Ipoison, I
′
poison I
′
poison is set of adversarial file-label pairs obtained
by perturbing non-adversarial files in Ipoison ⊂ I
O(z, z′) O(z, z′) : Z × Z → {true, false} is an oracle
telling if two files have the same functionality or not
δ ∈ ∆ manipulation vs. set of manipulations for perturbing
files with or without preserving their functionalities
M⊆ ∆, ZM M is file manipulation set; ZM ⊂ Z is set of
adversarial files generated using M
M, XM ⊆ X M is feature manipulation set; XM is set of adver-
sarial feature vectors generated using M
Γ(z, z′) Γ(z, z′) : Z × Z → R+ measures degree of
manipulation for perturbing z ∈ Z into z′ ∈ Z
C(x,x′) C(x,x′) : X ×X → R+ is the function measuring
the cost incurred by changing feature vector x to x′
δx ∈ Rd δx = x′ − x is a perturbation vector of x w.r.t. x′
φ : Z → X feature extraction function; x← φ(z), x′ ← φ(z′)
ϕ, f ϕ : X → R is classification function; f : Z → R is
classifier f = ϕ(φ(·)); by abusing notation a little
bit, we also use “+← f(z)” to mean that f predicts
z as malicious when f(z) ≥ τ for a threshold τ
Fθ : X → R machine learning algorithm with parameters θ
L : R× Y → R loss function measuring prediction error of Fθ
BE,OE,BP,OP attack tactics: basic and optimal evasion; basic and
optimal poisoning
EL,WR,AT defense tactics: ensemble learning, weight regular-
ization, adversarial training
IT,CD,RF, SE defense tactics: input transformation, classifier ran-
domization, robust feature, sanitizing examples
A1, . . . , A5 the 5 attributes under D’s control; they are known
to A at respective degrees a1, . . . , a5
A6, . . . , A9 the 4 attributes under A’s control; they are known
to D at respective degree a6, . . . , a9
RR,CR,DR,TR Representation Robustness, Classification Robust-
ness, Detection Robustness, Training Robustness
∗ the wildcard (taking any value in a domain)
malicious (benign). Let I = Z×Y be the file-label (example-
label) space. For training and evaluating a classifier in the
absence of adversarial files, D is given a set I ⊂ I of
non-adversarial benign/malicious files as well as their ground-
truth labels. D splits I into three disjoint sets: a training set
Itrain = {(zi, yi)}ni=1 where (zi, yi) ∈ I , a validation set for
model selection, and a test set for evaluation. Each file zi ∈ Z
is characterized by a set S of d features and represented by
a d-dimension vector xi = (xi,1, . . . , xi,d) in feature space
X = Rd, which accommodates both continuous and discrete
feature representations [57], [58], [13], [59], [60], [14]. The
process for obtaining feature representation xi of zi ∈ Z is
called feature extraction, denoted by function φ : Z → X
with xi ← φ(zi), where φ may be hand-crafted, automatically
learned, or a hybrid of both [61], [62]. There are two kinds
of features: static features are extracted via static analysis
(e.g., strings, API calls [63], [64], [65]); dynamic features
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are extracted via dynamic analysis (e.g., instructions, registry
activities [23], [66]).
As highlighted in Figure 1, D uses {(zi, yi)}ni=1 to learn a
malware detector or classifier f : Z → [0, 1], where f(·) =
ϕ(φ(·)) is composed of feature extraction function φ : Z → X
and classification function ϕ : X → [0, 1]. Note that f(z) ∈
[0, 1], namely ϕ(x) ∈ [0, 1] with x← φ(z), can be interpreted
as the probability that z is malicious. For a given threshold
τ ∈ [0, 1], we further say (by abusing notation a little bit) z is
labeled by f as + or +← f(z) if f(z) ≥ τ , and labeled as −
or − ← f(z) otherwise. In practice, f is often specified by a
learning algorithm F with some parameters (e.g., weights) that
can be collectively denoted by θ, which is tuned to minimize
an empirical risk [67]:
min
θ
L(θ, Itrain) = min
θ
1
n
∑
(zi,yi)∈Itrain
[L(Fθ(φ(zi)), yi)] ,
(1)
where L : R × Y → R is an appropriate loss function
measuring prediction error of Fθ (e.g., cross-entropy [68]).
 
?
Malicious/
Benign 
files
Classification
New
file
Training
Testing
Extracting Predicting
Decision
Feature vector
𝑛 
 
𝑥𝑛 ,1 𝑥𝑛 ,𝑑   
𝑥2,1  𝑥2,𝑑   
 𝑧𝑖 𝑖=1
𝑛  
𝜙 
𝑧 𝐱 
 𝐱𝑖 𝑖=1
𝑛  
𝜑 
Malicious
BenignFeature 
extraction Classification 
function 𝑦𝑖 𝑖=1
𝑛  
Ground truth
Malicious/Benign
Decision
 
?
Training 
files
New
file
Training
Testing
Extracting Predicting
 𝑧𝑖 𝑖=1
𝑛  
𝜙 
𝑧 𝐱 
 𝐱𝑖 𝑖=1
𝑛  Malicious
Benign
Feature 
extraction
 𝑦𝑖 𝑖=1
𝑛  Ground 
truth
Malicious/
Benign
Decision
𝜑 Classification 
function
Fig. 1: Illustration of ML-based malware detector/classifier.
B. Systematization Methodology
We systematize AMD studies through the lens of four
aspects: (i) the assumptions that are made; (ii) the attack or
threat model in terms of attacker A’s objective and A’s input,
with the latter including A’s information about D and A’s
own tactic; (iii) the defense in terms of D’s objective and D’s
input, with the latter including D’s information about A and
D’s own tactic; (iv) the security properties at stake. These four
aspects are respectively elaborated below.
C. Systematizing Assumptions
Four assumptions have been made in the AMD literature.
Assumption 1 below is quite strong and researchers have
started to weaken it [69], [70].
Assumption 1 (IID assumption; see, e.g., [71]). Computer files
in training data and testing data are independently drawn from
the same distribution.
Assumption 2 below is adapted from AML context, where
human can serve as an oracle O for determining whether
two images are the same [72]. In AMD context, O may be
instantiated as (or approximated by) malware analysts [29],
[44], [33], [73] or automated tools (e.g., Sandbox [42], [41]).
Assumption 2 (Oracle assumption; adapted from [72]). There
is an oracle O : Z×Z → {true, false} that tells if two files
z, z′ ∈ Z have the same functionality or not; true← O(z, z′)
if and only if z and z′ have the same functionality.
Assumption 3 below says that there is a way to measure the
degree of manipulation by which one file becomes another.
Assumption 3 (Measurability assumption [74], [75], [42]).
There is a function Γ(z, z′) : Z ×Z → R+ that measures the
degree of manipulation according to which a file z′ ∈ Z can
be derived from file z ∈ Z .
Since Assumption 3 is often difficult to validate, Γ(z, z′)
may be replaced by a function that quantifies the degree of
manipulation that can turn feature representation x into x′,
where x = φ(z) and x′ = φ(z′). This leads to:
Assumption 4 (Smoothness assumption [61]). There is a
function C(x,x′) : X ×X → R+ such that C(φ(z), φ(z′)) ≈
0 when (Γ(z, z′) ≈ 0) ∧ (true← O(z, z′)).
D. Systematizing Attacks
Attacker’s Objective. There are three kinds of objectives:
(i) Untargeted, meaning A attempts to cause as many false-
negatives as possible [37], [76], [32], [77], [78], [79]; (ii) Tar-
geted, meaning A attempts to cause specific false-negatives
(i.e., making certain malicious files evade the detection [40],
[39]); (iii) Frustration, meaning A attempts to frustrate D by
rendering A’s classifier f unusable (e.g., causing substantially
high false-positives [38], [80], [40], [81], [82]).
Attacker’s Input. Table II highlights the attributes we define
to describe A’s input, including: five attributes A1, . . . , A5 that
are under D’s control but may be known to A at some extent
a1, . . . , a5, respectively; and four attributes A6, . . . , A9 that
are under A’s control (indicated by 1). These attributes are
elaborated below.
TABLE II: Attributes for specifying A’s and D’s input.
Attributes Attacker A’s input Defender D’s input
Attributes under D’s control but may be known to A to some extent
A1: Training set Itrain a1 ∈ [0, 1] 1
A2: Defense tactic a2 ∈ {0, 1} 1
A3: Feature set S a3 ∈ [0, 1] 1
A4: Learning algorithm Fθ a4 ∈ [0, 1] 1
A5: Response a5 ∈ {0, 1} 1
Attributes under A’s control but may be known to D to some extent
A6: Manipulation set M 1 a6 ∈ [0, 1]
A7: Manipulation space 1 a7 ∈ {0, 1}
A8: Attack tactic 1 a8 ∈ {0, 1}
A9: Adversarial examples 1 a9 ∈ [0, 1]
A1 corresponds to D’s training set Itrain for learning
classifier f . We use a1 ∈ [0, 1] to represent the extent at which
Itrain is known to A. Let Iˆtrain ⊆ Itrain be the subset of D’s
training files that are known toA. Then, a1 = |Iˆtrain|/|Itrain|.
A2 describes D’s tactic, which can be Ensemble Learn-
ing (EL), Weight Regularization (WR), Adversarial Training
(AT), Input Transformation (IT), Classifier Randomization
(CD), Robust Feature (RF), Sanitizing Examples (SE). Let
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A2 ∈ {EL,WR,AT, IT,CD,RF,SE} and a2 ∈ {0, 1} such
that a2 = 0 means A does not know D’s tactic and a2 = 1
means A knows D’s tactic. The tactics are defined below.
Definition 1 (ensemble learning or EL [83]). D uses an
ensemble of classifiers for malware detection. Formally, let H
be the set of possible classifiers. Given m classifiers {fi}mi=1
where fi ∈ H and fi : Z → R, let fi be assigned with weight
vi with
∑m
i=1 vi = 1 and 0 ≤ vi ≤ 1. Then, f =
∑m
i=1 vifi.
Definition 2 (weight regularization or WR [68]). D uses
weight regularization to generalize models when optimizing
parameter θ of Fθ. Formally, given regularization item Ω, the
empirical risk is defined as min
θ
[L(θ, Itrain) + Ω(θ)], where
L(θ, Itrain) is defined in Eq. (1).
Definition 3 (adversarial training or AT [32]). D aims to
make its classifier f accommodate some information about
adversarial files. Formally, let I ′ denote a set of adversarial
file-label pairs, of which the adversarial files may be produced
by D, A or both. Then, D aims to tune model parameters θ
to minimize the empirical risk: min
θ
[L(θ, Itrain ∪ I ′)], where
L(θ, Itrain ∪ I ′) can be defined as in Eq. (1).
Definition 4 (input transformation or IT, adapted from [79]).
D aims to offset A’s manipulations. Formally, let IT : Z → Z
denote an input transformation in the file space. Given file z
and transformation IT, the classifier is f = ϕ(φ(IT(z))).
Note that Definition 4 can be extended to accommodate
transformations defined in the feature space.
Definition 5 (classifier randomization or CD; adapted from
[73]). D aims to randomize the feature representation used
by f , the learning algorithm, and/or response to A’s queries
(to prevent A from inferring information about f ). Formally,
given a set H of possible classifiers and an input file z, D
randomly selects m classifiers from H with replacement, say
{fi}mi=1. Then, f = 1m
∑m
i=1 fi(z).
Definition 6 (robust feature or RF; adapted from [84]). D
aims to use the features that can lead to higher detection
capability. Formally, let ACC denote the accuracy of a classi-
fication function learned from a feature set S′ ⊂ S. Given the
file-label space I that contains (adversarial) file-label pairs,
the set of robust feature set S∗ is S∗ = arg max
S′⊂S
(ACCI(S′)).
Definition 7 (sanitizing examples or SE; adapted from [38],
[85]). D aims to detect adversarial files by inventing a function
flag : Z → {yes, no} that indicates whether a file is
adversarial (yes) or not (no).
A3 corresponds to D’s feature set S. We use a3 ∈ [0, 1] to
represent the extent at which A knows about S. Let Sˆ ⊂ S
denote the features that are known to A. Then, a3 = |Sˆ|/|S|.
A4 is D’s learning algorithm F and parameters and hyperpa-
rameters [86], [80], [40], [87]. We use a4 ∈ [0, 1] to represent
that A knows an a4 degree about A4, where a4 = 0 means A
knows nothing and a4 = 1 means A knows everything.
A5 corresponds to D’s response to A’s query to f (if
applicable), which is relevant because A can learn useful
information about f by observing f ’s responses [88]. We
define a5 ∈ {0, 1} such that a5 = 0 means there is a limit on
the number of queries that can be made by A to f (referred
as LQ) and a5 = 1 means there is no limit (referred as FQ).
A6 corresponds to A’s manipulation set in the file or feature
space, which describes perturbations for generating adversarial
files (adapted from perturbation set in the AML literature
[89]). Let ∆ be the set of manipulations for perturbing files,
with or without preserving their functionalities. We define file
manipulation set M as:
M = {δ : (z′ ← A(z, δ)) ∧ (true← O(z, z′)) ∧
(z ∈ Z) ∧ (δ ∈ ∆) ∧ (z′ 6= z)}.
Note that computer files can be manipulated in many ways
(e.g., code injection, string encryption, packing, and object
replacement [5], [6], [7], [90], [49], [36], [41], [29], [91], [73]).
Let N denote the set of possible manipulations in the feature
space. We define feature manipulation set M corresponding
to file manipulation set M as:
M = {δx = x′ − x : (x = φ(z)) ∧ (x′ = φ(z′)) ∧
(z′ ← A(z, δ)) ∧ (δ ∈M) ∧ (z ∈ Z)}.
A7 indicates A’s manipulation space, meaning manipula-
tions are conducted in file space Z , feature space X , or both
(referred as ZX ).
A8 corresponds to A’s tactic. We consider two tactics:
evasion attack and poisoning attack. For the evasion attack, we
consider three variants: basic evasion (BE), optimal evasion
1 (OE1) and optimal evasion 2 (OE2). For the poisoning
attack, we consider two variants: basic poisoning (BP) and
optimal poisoning (OP). Correspondingly, we have A8 ∈
{BE,OE1,OE2,BP,OP}. These tactics are elaborated below,
while noting that they do not explicitly call oracle O because
definitions of manipulation setsM and M already assure that
manipulations preserve functionalities of non-adversarial files.
Definition 8 (basic evasion or BE [32]). A manipulates a
malicious file z, which is correctly classified by D’s classifier f
as +← f(z), into an adversarial file z′ such that − ← f(z′).
Formally, A achieves the following for z ∈ Z with +← f(z):
− ← f(z′) where (z′ ← A(z, δ)) ∧ (δ ∈M).
Definition 9 (optimal evasion 1 or OE1; adapted from [92]).
It is the same as BE, except that A attempts to minimize the
manipulation when perturbing a non-adversarial file z ∈ Z
into an adversarial file z′ ∈ Z . Formally, A attempts to
achieve the following for z ∈ Z with +← f(z):
min
z′
Γ(z′, z) s.t. (z′ ← A(z, δ)) ∧ (δ ∈M) ∧ (− ← f(z′)).
Let A have (i) a classifier g : Z → R that can mimic D’s
classifier f and (ii) a loss function LA : R × Y → R that
measures g’s error, which indicates A’ failure in evasion.
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Definition 10 (optimal evasion 2 or OE2; adapted from [28]).
It is the same as BE, except that A minimizes the loss LA
when generating adversarial malicious file z′ ∈ Z . Formally,
A attempts to achieve the following for z ∈ Z with +← f(z):
min
z′
LA(g(z
′),−) s.t. (z′ ← A(z, δ)) ∧ (δ ∈M) ∧ (Γ(z′, z) ≈ 0).
Note that Definition 9 is about minimizing A’s manipula-
tions, whereas Definition 10 is about minimizing A’s loss.
Let I ′poison ⊂ I be a set of adversarial file-label pairs
obtained by manipulating non-adversarial files in Ipoison. Let
I ′train ← Itrain ∪ I ′poison be the contaminated training data D
for learning classifier f˜ with parameters θ˜.
Definition 11 (basic poisoning or BP [45]). Let f be the
classifier learned from training dataset Itrain. Given a set
Itarget of files where + ← f(z˙) for z˙ ∈ Itarget and a set
Ipoison of non-adversarial files, A attempts to perturb files
in Ipoison to adversarial ones I ′poison = {(A(z, δ),A(y)) :
((z, y) ∈ Ipoison) ∧ (δ ∈ M)∧ (A(y) ∈ {+,−})} such that
classifier f˜ learned from I ′train ← Itrain∪ I ′poison misclassify
the files in Itarget. Formally, the attacker wants to achieve the
following for ∀ z˙ ∈ Itarget: − ← f˜(z˙) where f˜ is learned
from I ′train ← Itrain ∪ I ′poison.
Note that Definition 11 accommodates the attack tactic that
A directly manipulates labels of the files in Ipoison [93].
Definition 12 (optimal poisoning or OP [82]). It is the same
as BP, except that A attempts to maximize the loss when
using classifier f˜ with parameter θ˜ to classify files in Itarget.
Formally,
max
I′poison
L(θ˜, Itarget) where θ˜ = arg min
θ
L(θ, Itrain ∪ I ′poison).
Definition 12 has multiple variants by considering surrogate
malware detector [82], bounds on |I ′poison| [94], or bounds on
perturbations I ′poison [39].
A9 corresponds toA’s adversarial files. Given file manipula-
tion setM, the corresponding set of adversarial files is defined
as ZM = {A(z, δ) : (z ∈ Z) ∧ (δ ∈ M)}. Given feature
manipulation set M, the set of adversarial feature vectors is:
XM = {x′ : (x′ = x+δx)∧(δx ∈M)} = {φ(z′) : z′ ∈ ZM}.
On the Usefulness of the Preceding Definitions. The defini-
tions formulate a partial order in the attribute space, paving the
way for comparing attacks. For example, there are many grey-
box attacks between black-box attack (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) =
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0) and white-box attack (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) =
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1), as illustrated by Figure 5 of Appendix A.
E. Systematizing Defenses
Defender’s Objectives. D aims to detect ideally all of the
malicious files, adversarial and non-adversarial alike, while
suffering from small side-effects (e.g., low false-positives).
Defender’s Input. As highlighted in Table II, D’s input
includes attributes A1, . . . , A5, which are under D’s control,
and the extent a6, . . . , a9 at which D respectively knows about
attributes A6, . . . , A9, which are under A’s control. Note that
A1, . . . , A9 have been defined above.
We define a6 ∈ [0, 1] to represent the extent at which D
knows A’s file manipulation setM or feature manipulation set
M, depending on A’s manipulation space A7 ∈ {Z,X ,ZX}.
Let Mˆ ⊆ M and Mˆ ⊆M respectively denote the subset of
A’s manipulation set known to D. Then, a6 = |Mˆ|/|M| or
a6 = |Mˆ|/|M| depending on A7.
We define a7 ∈ {0, 1} such that a7 = 0 means D does not
know A’s manipulation space for certain and a7 = 1 means
that D knows A’s manipulation space (i.e., Z , X , or ZX ).
We define a8 ∈ {0, 1} such that a8 = 0 means D does not
know A’s tactic A8 ∈ {BE,OE1,OE2,BP,OP} and a8 = 1
means D knows A’s tactic (and its parameters, if applicable).
We use a9 = |Z∗M|/|ZM| to represent the extent at which
D knows about A’s adversarial files, where a9 ∈ [0, 1] and
ZM is A’s adversarial files and Z∗M ⊆ ZM is known to D.
On the Usefulness of the Preceding Definitions. The
definitions formulate a partial order in the attribute space,
paving the way for comparing defenses. For example,
there are many grey-box defenses between black-box de-
fense (a6, a7, a8, a9) = (0, 0, 0, 0) and white-box defense
(a6, a7, a8, a9) = (1, 1, 1, 1), as illustrated by Figure 6 of
Appendix B.
F. Systematizing Security Properties
Since f = ϕ(φ(·)), we decompose f ’s security properties
into ϕ’s and φ’s. We consider Representation Robustness
(RR), Classification Robustness (CR), Detection Robustness
(DR) and Training Robustness (TR).
Definition 13 (RR or (, η)-robust feature extraction; adapted
from [72]). It says that two similar files have similar feature
representations. Formally, given constants , η ∈ [0, 1], and
files z, z′ ∈ Z such that (Γ(z, z′) ≈ 0) ∧ (true← O(z, z′)),
we say feature extraction function φ is (, η)-robust if
P(C(x,x′) ≤ ) = P(C(φ(z), φ(z′)) ≤ ) > 1− η.
Definition 14 (CR or -robust classification [95]). It says that
two similar feature representations lead to the same label.
Formally, given constant  ∈ [0, 1] as in Definition 13 and
any feature vectors x,x′ ∈ X , we say classification function
ϕ is -robust if
(C(x,x′) ≤ )→ ((ϕ(x) > τ) ∧ (ϕ(x′) > τ)).
Definitions 13 and 14 collectively say that when two files z
and z′ are similar (i.e., considering small manipulations), they
would be classified into the same label with a high probability.
Definition 15 (DR or η-robust detection; adapted from [33]).
It says that when large manipulations are relevant, classifier
f should classify two very different files with the same label
as long as they have the same functionality. Formally, given
constant η ∈ [0, 1] and any files z, z′ ∈ Z such that
(Γ(z, z′) >> 0) ∧ (true ← O(z, z′)), we say malware
detector f is η-robust if
P((f(z) > τ) ∧ (f(z′) > τ)) > 1− η.
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Let adversarial files set I ′poison be restricted to |I ′poison| ≤
γ|Itrain| for some constant γ ∈ [0, 1]. Let classifier f˜ be
learned from Itrain ∪ I ′poison.
Definition 16 (TR or (γ, ζ)-robust training; adapted from
[94]). It says classifier f˜ learned from poisoned training set
can predict as well as f with a high probability. Formally,
given classifiers f learned from Itrain and f˜ learned from
Itrain ∪ I ′poison where |I ′poison| ≤ γ|Itrain|, and small con-
stants ζ ∈ [0, 1], we say f˜ is (γ, ζ)-robust if ∀z ∈ Z
((f(z) > τ) ∧ (|I ′poison| ≤ γ|Itrain|))→ (P(f˜(z) > τ) > 1− ζ).
III. SYSTEMATIZING AMD ARMS RACE
We systematize attacks according to A’s objective, input,
assumptions, the security properties that are broken, and
the types of victim malware detectors (e.g., Windows vs.
Android). Similarly, we systematize defenses according to D’s
objective, input, assumptions, the security properties that are
achieved, and the types of enhanced malware detectors (e.g.,
Windows vs. Android). We present attacks (defenses) in their
chronological order of publication and then summarize them
in a succinct table. For convenience, we will use wildcard ∗
to indicate any value in a domain (e.g., [0, 1]); we will use ∨
to describe A’s and D’s “broader” input (if applicable). For
example, (0, 1, 0, 1, 0|A6, . . . , A9) ∨ (1, 0, 1, 1, 1|A6, . . . , A9)
means that A has either (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0) or
(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) = (1, 0, 1, 1, 1). Finally, we will present the
attack-defense escalation.
A. Systematizing Attack Literature
Biggio et al. [28] propose optimal evasion attack tactic
OE2 in feature space X , dubbed gradient descent and ker-
nel density estimation. Feature representation is the number
of appearances of hand-selected keywords (e.g., JavaScript);
feature manipulation set M corresponds to feature injections.
A’s loss has two parts: one accommodates D’s classifier
f misclassifying adversarial feature vector x′ and the other
corresponds to lifting x′ into a populated region of benign files.
Under the Oracle and Measurability Assumptions, Γ(z, z′) ≈
0 is replaced by C(x,x′) ≤ . The authors use gradient
descent to solve OE2 optimization (Definition 10). When
D employs no countermeasures, knowing D’s feature set S
and learning algorithm F is sufficient for A to evade D’s
detector. This attack and its variants can evade PDF malware
detectors [29], [53], [105], [84], PE malware detector [75]
and Flash malware detector [106]. In summary, A’s input
is (a1, . . . , a5|A6, · · · , A9) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,OE2,XM)∨
(0, 0, 1, ∗, 0|M,X ,OE2,XM) and A breaks the CR property.
Smutz and Stavrou [96] propose a mimicry attack to modify
features of a malicious file to mimic benign ones, while
assuming that A knows D’s classifier f . The attack is validated
using PDF malware detector. The attack works under the Mea-
surability assumption with input (a1, . . . , a5|A6, · · · , A9) =
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1|∆,X ,OE2,X ) and breaks the CR property.
Maiorca et al. [97] propose a reverse mimicry attack against
PDF malware detectors. Instead of modifying malicious files to
mimic benign ones, A embeds malicious payload into benign
files. The attack works under the Oracle assumption with input
(a1, . . . , a5|A6, · · · , A9) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0|M,Z,BE,ZM) and
breaks the DR property.
Sˇrndic´ and Laskov [29] investigate the mimicry attack [107],
[29] and the aforementioned gradient descent and kernel
density estimation attack against PDF malware detectors (e.g.,
PDFrate), without being constrained by small manipulations.
Manipulation set M corresponds to adding instructions into
PDF files. The attack first derives perturbed feature vectors
using a surrogate model, then maps the perturbed feature
vectors to the file space, and finally inject manipulations at
pre-determined positions of a file to obtain an adversarial
file. The attack works under the Oracle assumption with
input (a1, . . . , a5|A6, · · · , A9) = (0, 0, ∗, 0, 0|M,ZX ,BE,XM) ∨
(0, 0, ∗, ∗, 0|M,ZX ,BE,XM) ∨ (1, 0, ∗, 0, 0|M,ZX ,BE,XM) ∨
(1, 0, ∗, ∗, 0|M,ZX ,BE,XM) and breaks the DR property.
Xu et al. [41] propose an evasion attack against PDF mal-
ware detectors [96], [29], [108]. A can query D’s detector f
at will. Manipulation setM corresponds to deleting, inserting,
and modifying PDF components (e.g., /Root/Kids/1). A
manipulates a malware file to obtain a candidate and uses
O (e.g., sandbox) and detector f to decide if the candidate
is functionality-preserving and adversarial. This attack works
with empirical Oracle and input (a1, · · · , a5|A6, · · · , A9) =
(0, 0, 0, 0, 1|M,Z,BE,ZM) and breaks DR.
Yang et al. [78] propose an evasion attack against Android
malware detectors. A uses a surrogate model and manipulation
set M corresponding to Android obfuscations (e.g., repack-
ing). The attack works under the Oracle assumption with input
(a1, · · · , a5|A6, · · · , A9) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1|M,Z,BE,ZM) and
breaks the DR property.
Hu and Tan [98] propose an evasion attack using Generative
Adversarial Networks (GAN) [109]. A modifies the binary
representation of malicious files in Windows API calls to
mimic benign files, by flipping some feature values from
0 to 1. A learns a generator, say Gθg , and a discrimina-
tor from A’s training dataset, which is different from D’s.
An adversarial feature vector can be generated using x′ =
max(x, round(Gθg (x,a))), where a is a vector of noise,
round is the round function, and max means element-wise
maximum. The discriminator is a surrogate detector learned
from feature vectors corresponding to A’s benign files and
those produced by Gθg , along with labels predicted by D’s
detector f . Hu and Tan [99] propose another evasion attack in
[110]. Both attacks work under the Oracle assumption with in-
put (a1, · · · , a5|A6, · · · , A9) = (0, 0, 1, 0, 1|M,X ,BE,XM)
and breaks the DR property.
Demontis et al. [36] propose the optimal evasion OE2 tactic
to perturb important features in terms of their weights in the
linear function ϕ(x) = w>x + b of SVM classifier, where
w = (w1, w2, · · · , wd) is a weight vector, b is bias, and d
is the input dimension. A manipulates the xi’s with largest
|wi|’s as follows: decrease xi if wi > 0, increase xi if wi < 0,
and do nothing otherwise, while obeying the manipulation set
M that corresponds to feature injection and removal. The
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TABLE III: Summary AMD attacks, where Xindicates applicability, means 0, means 1, means a value in [0, 1].
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Biggio et al. [28] X M X OE2 XM X X X X
Smutz and Stavrou [96] X N X OE2 X X X X
Maiorca et al. [97] X M Z BE ZM X X X
Sˇrndic´ and Laskov [29] X M ZX BE XM X X X
Xu et al. [41] X M Z BE ZM X X
Yang et al. [78] X M Z BE ZM X X X
Hu and Tan [98] X M X BE XM X X X
Hu and Tan [99] X M X BE XM X X X
Demontis et al. [36] X M X OE2 XM X X X X
Grosse et al. [32] X M X OE2 XM X X X X X
Chen et al. [100] X M X OE2 XM X X X X
Khasawneh et al. [73] X M ZX BE XM X X X
Rosenberg et al. [101] X M ZX BE XM X X X X
Dang et al. [42] X M Z BE ZM X X
Anderson et al. [91] X M Z OE2 ZM X X X X
Al-Dujaili et al. [33] X M X BE XM X X X
Kreuk et al. [102] X M X OE2 XM X X X X
Kolosnjaji et al. [75] X M X OE2 XM X X X X
Suciu et al. [103] X M X OE2 XM X X X X
Chen et al. [104] X M
M
X
X
OE1
OE2
XM
XM X X X X
Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. [82] X M X OP XM X X X
Chen et al. [38] X M X BP XM X X X
Suciu et al. [39] X M ZX BP XM X X X
attack is waged against Android malware detector learned
from the Drebin dataset (see Appendix C). The attack works
under the Oracle and Measurability assumptions with input
(a1, · · · , a5|A6, · · · , A9) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,OE2,XM) ∨
(0, 0, 1, ∗, 0|M,X ,OE2,XM) and breaks the CR property.
Grosse et al. [32] propose a variant of JSMA to evade
DNN-based malware detector learned from the Drebin dataset.
A injects manifest features to manipulate Android Packages
and generates adversarial files from D’s detector f directly,
while D may employ countermeasures such as adversarial
training. The attack works under the Oracle and Measur-
ability assumptions with input (a1, · · · , a5|A6, · · · , A9) =
(0, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,OE2,XM) and breaks RR and CR.
Chen et al. [100] propose considering manipulation cost
C(x,x′) =
∑d
i=1 ci|xi − x′i|, where ci is the hardness of
changing the ith feature while preserving malware’s function-
ality. A uses a wrapper-based feature selection algorithm (e.g.,
max-relevance or information-gain [100], [44], [84], [111])
to select important features for manipulation. The attack is
waged against Windows PE malware detector that uses hand-
crafted Windows API calls as features and the binary feature
representation. This attack works under the Oracle and Mea-
surability assumptions with input (a1, . . . , a5|A7, · · · , A9) =
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,OE2,XM)) and breaks CR.
Khasawneh et al. [73] propose evading hardware malware
detector learned from low-level hardware features (e.g., in-
struction mixes [112]). A knows some features used by D.
A first performs reverse-engineering to obtain a surrogate
model of D’s detector, and then generate adversarial files
to evade the surrogate model. Manipulation set M corre-
sponds to injecting instructions. The attack works under the
Oracle assumption with input (a1, . . . , a5|A6, · · · , A9) =
(0, 0, ∗, 0, 1|M,ZX ,BE,XM) and breaks CR.
Rosenberg et al. [101] use a Recurrent Neural Network
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(RNN) surrogate model to evade malware detectors learned
from Windows API calls. A’s training data is different from
D’s, but their labels are obtained from A’s detector. A can
further augment its training data using the Jacobian-based
augmentation technique [113]. A modifies an API sequence
in the direction of the `∞ normalized gradient of the loss
function. Manipulation set M corresponds to inserting no-
op API calls. A can evade DNN- and RNN-based detectors.
The attack works under the Oracle assumption with in-
put (a1, . . . , a5|A6, · · · , A9) = (0, 0, 1, 0, 1|M,ZX ,BE,XM)
and breaks RR and CR.
Dang et al. [42] propose an evasion attack against malware
detectors (e.g., PDFrate). Given a malicious file z, A uses the
hill-climbing algorithm [114] to iteratively generate adversar-
ial file z′ from z as follows: (i) A generates a sequence of
variants from each candidate (or z in the initial iteration). (ii)
A queries variant to O and D’s detector f . (iii) A succeeds
when obtaining z′ where (True ← O(z, z′)) ∧ (− ← f(z′));
otherwise, A uses a score function to select candidates for
the next iteration or aborts after reaching a threshold number
of iterations. The attack has input (a1, · · · , a5|A6, · · · , A9) =
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0|M,Z,BE,ZM) and breaks DR.
Anderson et al. [77], [91] propose a Reinforcement
Learning-based evasion attack against PE malware detectors.
A’s input includes labels predicted by A’s detector f . Ma-
nipulation set M corresponds to code injection (e.g., API
insertion) and code deletion (e.g., change section names). A
learns to evade f by applying a small number of manipulations
to a malicious PE file, meaning Γ(z, z′) ≤ 10. Experimental
results show that the attack is not as effective as others
(e.g., gradient-based methods). The attack works under the
Oracle assumption with input (a1, · · · , a5|A6, · · · , A9) =
(0, 0, 0, 0, 1|M,Z,OE2,ZM) and breaks RR and CR.
Al-Dujaili et al. [33] propose evasion attacks against DNN-
based malware detectors. A generates adversarial files in fea-
ture space X by maximizing D’s loss and using possibly large
perturbations. Manipulation set M corresponds to flipping 0 to
1 in the binary feature representation. The attack works under
the Oracle assumption with input (a1, . . . , a5|A6, · · · , A9) =
(0, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,BE,XM) and breaks DR.
Kreuk et al. [102] propose an OE2 attack against Mal-
Conv [25], which is an end-to-end Windows PE malware
detector (see Appendix D). A generates adversarial files by
manipulating non-adversarial malicious files in the direction of
normalized gradients of the loss function [115], [116], [117].
For example, the `∞-norm based attack in the feature space is
x′ = x−·sign(∇x(L(Fθ(x),−)), where sign(a) = +1 (−1)
if a ≥ 0 (a < 0), and Fθ, , L are respectively a DNN,
a perturbation bound, and the DNN’s loss function. Feature
manipulation set M corresponds to appending instructions at
pre-determined locations of PE files. The attack works under
the Oracle assumption with input (a1, · · · , a5|A6, · · · , A9) =
(0, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,OE2,XM) and breaks RR and CR.
Kolosnjaji et al. [75] and Suciu et al. [103] independently
propose gradient-based attacks to evade MalConv [25]. The
former uses (i) file manipulation set M corresponding to
appending instructions at the end of a file and (ii) `2 nor-
malized gradients of the classifier’s loss function to modify
embedding codes (i.e., features corresponding to modifiable
instructions in PE files). The latter perturbs embedding codes
in the direction of `∞ normalized gradients of the classifier’s
loss function, while aiming to add instructions to PE files.
Both attacks work under the Oracle assumption with in-
put (a1, · · · , a5|A6, · · · , A9) = (0, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,OE2,XM)
and break RR and CR.
Chen et al. [104] propose evasion attacks against two An-
droid malware detectors, MaMaDroid and Drebin [21], [20],
in the feature space, using manipulation set M corresponding
to manifest features (e.g., activities) and APIs injections. A
evades MaMaDroid by using the optimal evasions OE1 and
OE2 tactics and evades Drebin by using OE2, where OE1 is
solved using the method proposed in [92] and OE2 is solved
using the JSMA method [118]. The OE2 tactic works under
the Oracle and Measurability assumptions, with four kinds of
input (a1, · · · , a5|A6, · · · , A9) = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0|M,X ,OE2,XM) ∨
(0, 0, 1, 0, 1|M,X ,OE2,XM) ∨ (1, 0, 1, 0, 0|M,X ,OE2,XM) ∨
(1, 0, 1, 0, 1|M,X ,OE2,XM), and breaks CR. The OE1 attack
works under the same assumptions with the same input except
using tactic OE1, and breaks CR.
Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. [82] propose the optimal poison-
ing OP, which is NP-hard. The optimization problem can
be transformed into an easier problem that can be tack-
led using the back-gradient optimization method when the
KKT condition holds [80], [119], [82]. The attack is waged
against the Windows PE malware detector. Feature set S
includes API calls, actions and modifications in the file
system; each file is represented by a binary vector. The
attack has two variants: one uses white-box input, allowing
A to derive I ′poison from D’s detector f ; and the other
uses grey-box input, allowing A to know D’s training set
as well as feature set and to train a surrogate detector.
The attack works under the Oracle assumption with input
(a1, . . . , a5|A6, · · · , A9) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,OP,XM) ∨
(1, 0, 1, 0, 0|M,X ,OP,XM) and breaks TR.
Chen et al. [38] propose a basic poisoning BP tactic
against Android malware detectors. Feature manipulation set
M corresponds to feature injection or removal, but not
both. A poisons D’s training data by injecting adversarial
malicious files with label −. The attack works under the
Oracle assumption with input (a1, . . . , a5|A6, · · · , A9) =
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,BP,XM) ∨ (0, 0, 0, 1, 1|M,X ,BP,XM) ∨
(1, 0, ∗, 1, 1|M,X ,BP,XM) and breaks TR.
Suciu et al. [39] propose a basic poisoning attack to obtain
I ′poison by applying small manipulations to non-adversarial
benign files, whose labels are obtained by querying VirusTotal.
A’s objective is to make D’s classifier f misclassify a target
malware file zmal as benign. A proceeds as following: (i)
obtain an initial benign file zben, where zben ≈ zmal in the
feature space with respect to the `1-norm; (ii) use the JSMA
method [118] to manipulate zben to z′ben by applying a small
perturbation so that they have similar feature representations;
(iii) use the combination of the pristine training set and the
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crafted training set to train classifier f˜ ; and (iv) add z′ben to
I ′poison if it lowers the classification accuracy slightly, and re-
ject it otherwise. The attack is waged against the Drebin detec-
tor [20]. This attack works under the Oracle assumption with
input (a1, . . . , a5|A6, · · · , A9) = (∗, 0, 1, ∗, 0|M,ZX ,BP,XM) ∨
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,ZX ,BP,XM) ∨ (1, 0, ∗, ∗, 0|M,ZX ,BP,XM) ∨
(1, 0, 1, 0, 0|M,ZX ,BP,XM) and breaks TR.
Summary and Drawing Insights (via machine learning).
Table III succinctly summarizes the preceding attacks. From
Table III and the preceding discussion we draw:
Insight 1 (Insights manually drawn). (i) Untargeted attack has
been most extensively investigated; targeted and frustration
attacks have been little investigated. (ii) Evasion attack has
been much more extensively studied than poisoning attack. (iii)
The Oracle assumption has been widely made. (iv) Knowing
defender’s feature set is critical to the attacker’s success,
suggesting the importance of keeping defender’s feature set
secret or randomizing defender’s feature set.
In order to draw further insights, we propose applying ML
to the systematized structured data in Table III. We propose
formulating insights learning as a multiclass classification
problem. We use attributes of attack objective, attack input
and assumption as features and treat the broken properties
as the labels to learn. We preprocess data as follows: for
features corresponding to attack objective and assumption, we
use 1 to represent “applicable” and 0 otherwise; for features
corresponding to A1, . . . , A5, we set ai = 0.5 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 5;
for features corresponding to categorical A6, . . . , A9, we use
integers to represent the elements (e.g., 0,1,2 respectively
representing N,M,M for A6). This leads to a dataset of 41
attacks, each of which has 16 dimensions. We use the dataset
to train a Random Forest model with default hyper-parameters
in scikit-learn [120]. We focus on learning important attributes.
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Fig. 2: Insights learning from systematized AMD attacks via
attribute importance.
Figure 2 highlights the most important features, from which
we make the following observations. (i) Attack tactic is the
most important feature in determining the security property
that is broken. This can be explained because BE breaks DR,
OE2 usually breaks CR and RR, and poisoning attacks (BP
and OP) break TR. (ii) The Measurability assumption is
the second important feature. This can be explained because
RR and CR are defined with respect to feature-space small-
manipulation attacks, which need this assumption. (iii) Manip-
ulation space is the third important feature perhaps because
small manipulations (corresponding to CR) is usually used
in the feature space; whereas, large manipulations are often
used in file space or both spaces. (iv) Feature set is the fourth
important feature, resonating the manually-drawn insight (iv)
mentioned above.
Insight 2 (Insights learned via ML). Technique-wise, attack
tactic (a core part of the threat model) largely determines
what security property is broken. Methodology-wise, ML is an
effective method for insights learning in SoK studies.
B. Systematizing Defense Literature
Biggio et al. [121] propose a one-and-a-half-class classifier
against evasion attacks, which aims to leverage the insight
— the decision boundary of one-class classifiers is often
tighter than that of two-class classifiers — to assure that
outliers can be correctly classified [121]. The defense en-
hances the PDF malware detector against the gradient descent-
based attack [28] with input (a1, · · · , a5|A6, · · · , A9) =
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,OP2,XM)∨(0, 0, 1, ∗, 0|M,X ,OP2,XM).
The defense works under the IID assumption with input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (Itrain,EL, S, Fθ,FQ|0, 0, 0, 0)
and achieves the CR property.
Smutz and Stavrou [69] propose an ensemble classifier
to defend against evasion attacks by returning classification
results as benign, uncertain and malicious according to the vot-
ing result (e.g., [0%, 25%] classifiers saying malicious can be
treated as benign, [25%, 75%] saying malicious can be treated
as uncertain, and [75%, 100%] saying malicious can be treated
as malicious). The defense enhances a PDF malware detec-
tor against attacks [29] with input (a1, . . . , a5|A6, · · · , A9) =
(0, 0, ∗, 0, 0|M,ZX ,BE,XM) ∨ (0, 0, ∗, ∗, 0|M,ZX ,BE,XM) ∨
(1, 0, ∗, 0, 0|M,ZX ,BE,XM) ∨ (1, 0, ∗, ∗, 0|M,ZX ,BE,XM) .
The defense works under the IID assumption with input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (Itrain, SE, S, Fθ,FQ|0, 0, 0, 0) and
achieves DR.
Zhang et al. [84] investigate how to use adversarial
feature selection to defend against evasion attacks.
The defense enhances PDF malware detectors against
the gradient descent-based attack, which can be
succinctly described as (A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) =
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,OE2,XM) ∨ (0, 0, 1, ∗, 0|M,X ,OE2,XM).
The defense works under the IID, Oracle Mea-
surability and smoothness assumptions with input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (Itrain,RF, S, Fθ,FQ|1, 1, 0, 0),
and achieves RR and CR.
Demontis et al. [36] enhance the linear Drebin malware
detector ϕ(x) = w>x + b by using box-constraint weights
w
(lb)
i ≤ wi ≤ w(ub)i for 1 ≤ i ≤ d and leveraging that a clas-
sifier’s sensitivity to `1-norm based manipulations is bounded
by the `∞-norm of the weights. This defense enhances
the Drebin detector against the mimicry attack with input
(a1, · · · , a5|A6, · · · , A9) = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0|M,X ,BE,XM), the
9
TABLE IV: Summary of AMD defenses, where Xindicates applicability, means 0, means 1, means a value in [0, 1].
Defense
(in chronological order)
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Biggio et al. [121] X Itrain EL S Fθ FQ X X X
Smutz and Stavrou [69] X Itrain SE S Fθ FQ X X X
Zhang et al. [84] X Itrain RF S Fθ FQ X X X X X X X
Demontis et al. [36] X Itrain WR S Fθ FQ X X X X X
Grosse et al. [32] X Itrain WR S Fθ FQ X X X X
Grosse et al. [32] X Itrain AT S Fθ FQ X X X X X X
Tong et al. [122] X Itrain RF S Fθ FQ X X X X
Wang et al. [37] X Itrain IT S Fθ FQ X X
Chen et al. [100] X Itrain AT S Fθ FQ X X X X X
Khasawneh et al. [73] X Itrain CD S Fθ FQ X X X
Yang et al. [78] X Z
∗
M∪
Itrain
AT S Fθ FQ X X X
Yang et al. [78] X Itrain SE S Fθ FQ X X X
Dang et al. [42] X Itrain SE S Fθ FQ X X X
Chen et al. [44] X Itrain RF S Fθ FQ X X X X X X X
Incer et al. [123] X Itrain RF S Fθ FQ X X X X X
Al-Dujaili et al. [33] X Itrain AT S Fθ FQ X X X X
Chen et al. [79] X Itrain IT S Fθ FQ X X
Jordan et al. [124] X Itrain RF S Fθ FQ X X X X
Li et al. [125] X Itrain AT S Fθ FQ X X X X X X
Chen et al. [38] X Itrain SE S Fθ FQ X X X
obfuscation attack [126] with input (a1, · · · , a5|A6, · · · , A9) =
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0|M,Z,BE,ZM), and the attack that modifies im-
portant features [36] with input (a1, · · · , a5|A6, · · · , A9) =
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,OE2,XM)∨(0, 0, 1, ∗, 0|M,X ,OE2,XM).
The defense works under the IID, Oracle and Measur-
ability assumptions with input (A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) =
(Itrain,WR, S, Fθ, A5|1, 0, 0, 0) and achieves CR.
Grosse et al. [32] propose two defenses, dubbed distil-
lation and retraining, to enhance DNN-based malware de-
tectors. Both defenses enhance an Android malware de-
tector against a variant of the JSMA attack with input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (0, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,OE2,XM). The
distillation defense works under the IID assumption with input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (Itrain,WR, S, Fθ,FQ|0, 0, 0, 0) and
achieves RR and CR. The retraining defense works under
the IID, Oracle and Measurability assumptions with input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (Itrain,AT, S, Fθ,FQ|1, 1, 1, 0)
and achieves RR and CR.
Tong et al. [122], [127] propose refining features into ideally
invariant ones to defend against evasion attacks. The defense is
validated against the genetic algorithm attack [41] with input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1|M,Z,BE,ZM).
The defense has input (A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) =
(Itrain,RF, S, Fθ,FQ|1, 0, 0, 0), and achieves RR, CR
and DR.
Random feature nullification (RFN) [37] enhances DNN-
based malware detectors against the FGSM attack [115]
by nullifying (or dropping) features randomly in both
training and testing phases. This offers a probabilistic
assurance in preventing a white-box attacker from deriving
adversarial files by using gradients of the loss function
with respect to input. The defense enhances Windows
malware detectors against the FGSM attack with input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (0, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,OE2,XM) ∨
(0, 0, 1, ∗, 0|M,X ,OE2,XM). The defense has input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (Itrain, IT, S, Fθ,FQ|0, 0, 0, 0)
and achieves CR.
SecDefender [100] enhances linear malware detectors by
adopting the generic retraining framework proposed in AML
context [128]; the idea is to incorporate a label smooth-
ness regularization to reduce some negative impact of ad-
versarial training [129]. It is validated using Windows
malware detectors against “feature selection”-based white-
box evasion attacks with input (A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) =
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,OE2,XM). The defense works under the
IID, Oracle and Measurability assumptions with input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (Itrain,AT, S, Fθ,FQ|1, 1, 1, 0) and
achieves CR.
Khasawneh et al. [73] propose randomizing classifiers (i.e.,
using one randomly chosen from a pool of classifiers that use
heterogeneous features) to defend against reverse engineering
attacks. The defense is validated against an attack with in-
put (a1, . . . , a5|a6, · · · , a9) = (0, 0, ∗, 0, 1|M,Z,BE,ZM).
The defense works under the IID assumption with input
(a1, . . . , a5|a6, · · · , a9) = (Itrain,CR, S, Fθ,FQ|0, 0, 1, 0)
and achieves CR.
10
Yang et al. [78] leverage adversarial training and
variant detector and box-constraint weights to defend
against genetic algorithm-based evasion attacks with input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1|M,Z,BE,ZM).
Adversarial training works under the IID assumption
with input (A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (Itrain ∪
Z∗M,AT, S, Fθ,FQ|0, 1, 0, ∗) and achieves DR. The variant
detector works under the IID assumption with input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (Itrain,SE, S, Fθ,FQ|1, 0, 1, 0)
and achieves DR.
Dang et al. [42] propose enhancing PDF malware detectors
by lowering the classification threshold τ to classify more
files as malicious, rendering evasion attacks harder to succeed.
This defense works under the IID assumption with input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (Itrain,SE, S, Fθ,FQ|0, 0, 0, 0)
and achieves DR.
Chen et al. [44] propose mitigating evasive attacks by
filtering features according to their importance |wi|/ci
with respect to linear SVM classification function
ϕ(x) = w>x + b, where xi, wi and ci are respectively
the ith component of x, w and the constraint on manipulation
cost c. The defense enhances Android malware detectors
against an attack with input (A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) =
(0, 0, 1, 0, 0|M,X ,BE,XM), against a variant of the
mimicry attack with input (0, 0, 1, 0, 0|M,X ,BE,XM),
and against the well-crafted attack with input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,BE,XM).
The defense works under the IID, Oracle, Mea-
surability and smoothness assumptions with input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (Itrain,RF, S, Fθ,FQ|1, 1, 0, 0)
and achieves RR and CR.
Incer et al. [123] propose learning a monotonic malware
classifier against the evasion attack that manipulates malware
files by injecting instructions. A monotonic classification
function satisfies that ϕ(x) ≤ ϕ(x′) when x ≤ x′ [130].
Monotonic features are the ones that can be modified by
insertion or removal operations, but not both. These kinds of
features can be extracted from PE files (e.g., dynamic imports)
and are used to train monotonic malware detectors, meaning
that the attack can perturb these features by adding instructions
only. This causes an attack to fail when ϕ(x) ≤ ϕ(x′).
The defense works under the IID assumption with input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (Itrain,RF, S, Fθ,FQ|1, 0, 0, 0)
and achieves RR, CR and DR.
Al-Dujaili et al. [33] adapt the idea of minmax adversarial
training (in AML context) to enhance DNN-based malware
detectors as follows: the inner-layer optimization generates
adversarial files by maximizing the classifier’s loss function;
the outer-layer optimization searches for parameters θ of DNN
Fθ that minimize the classifier’s loss upon the generated
adversarial files. The defense enhances Windows malware
detectors against attacks with input (A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) =
(0, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,OE2,XM). The defense works under the IID
and Oracle assumptions with input (A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) =
(Itrain,AT, S, Fθ,FQ|1, 1, 0, 0) and achieves DR.
DroidEye [79] defends Android malware detectors against
evasion attacks by quantizing binary representations, namely
transforming binary representations into real values and then
using compression to reduce the effect of adversarial ma-
nipulations. The defense enhances linear malware detec-
tors against a “feature selection”-based attack with input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,OE2,XM) [100]
and the FGSM attack with input (A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) =
(0, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,OE2,XM) [115]. The defense has the input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (Itrain, IT, S, Fθ,FQ|0, 0, 0, 0) and
achieves CR.
Jordan et al. [124] propose a robust PDF malware
detector against evasion attacks by interpreting JavaScript
behaviours using static analysis. A PDF file is classified
as malicious when it calls a vulnerable API method
or when it exhibits a potentially malicious or unknown
behavior. The defense is validated against the reverse
mimicry attack [97] with input (A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) =
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0|M,Z,BE,ZM). The defense has input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (Itrain,RF, S, Fθ,FQ|1, 0, 0, 0)
where θ = ∅ and achieves RR, CR and DR.
Li et al. [125] propose a DNN-based attack-agnostic frame-
work for classifying adversarial malware files. The framework
wins the AICS’2019 adversarial malware classification chal-
lenge organized by MIT Lincoln Lab researcher [131], without
knowing about the attack. The defense works under the
IID, Measurability and Smoothness assumptions with input
(A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (Itrain,AT, S, Fθ,FQ|0, 0, 0, 0)
and achieves RR and CR.
Chen et al. [38] investigate defending Android
malware detectors against poisoning attacks with input
(a1, . . . , a5|A6, · · · , A9) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1|M,X ,BP,XM) ∨
(0, 0, 0, 1, 1|M,X ,BP,XM) ∨ (1, 0, ∗, 1, 1|M,X ,BP). The
idea is to filter adversarial files that are distant from non-
adversarial ones, where distance is measured by the Jaccard
index, Jaccard-weight similarity and cosine similarity. The
defense works under the Measurability assumption with
input (A1, · · · , A5|a6, · · · , a9) = (Itrain, SE, S, Fθ,FQ|0, 0, 0, 0)
and achieves TR.
Summary and Drawing Insights (via ML). Table IV suc-
cinctly summarizes the preceding defenses. From Table IV and
the preceding discussion we draw:
Insight 3 (Manually manually drawn). (i) Most studies fo-
cus on black-box defenses (i.e., defender knows little about
the attacker), which is against the principle of “knowing
yourself and knowing your enemy”. (ii) Most studies have
been focusing on defenses against evasion attacks rather than
poisoning attacks. (iii) There is no silver bullet defense against
evasion attacks or poisoning attacks, at least for now. (iv)
AMD security properties have been evaluated empirically
rather than rigorously proven (despite that provable security
in AML is emerging; see for example [132], [133], [134]).
(v) Sanitizing adversarial files as outliers is effective against
black-box and grey-box attacks, but not white-box attacks.
In order to draw further insights, we train another Random
Forest model from the systematized structure data presented in
11
Table IV. We use attributes of defense objective, defense input,
and assumptions as features and treat the achieved properties
as the labels to learn. The data preprocessing is the similar to
insight learning from AMD attacks. This leads to a dataset of
20 defenses, each of which has 14 dimensions.
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35
Adversarial exam ple
Oracle assum pt ion
Training set  It rain
Manipulat ion space
At tack tact ic
Sm oothness assum pt ion
IID assum pt ion
Manipulat ion set
Measurability assum pt ion
Defense tact ic
At t ribute Im portance (Defense)
Fig. 3: Insights learning from systematized AMD defenses via
attribute importance.
Figure 3 shows the most important features on AMD
defenses, from which we make the following observations.
(i) Defense tactic is the most important feature in deter-
mining the empirically achieved security property. This can
be explained because EL, IT,CD,WR enhance the classifier
against small manipulations to achieve the CR property; SE
usually achieves the DR property against large manipulations,
which could be detected as outliers; AT,RF enhance classifiers
against certain attacks specified by the defender. (ii) The
Measurability assumption is the second important feature.
(iii) Manipulation set is the third important feature because
knowing this attribute enables the defender to design RF and
AT tactics, which can enhance classifiers to achieve empirical
RR, CR and DR properties.
Insight 4 (Insights automatically learned). Technique-wise,
defense tactic largely determines what security properties can
be (empirically) achieved and knowing attacker’s manipula-
tion set is critical to defender’s success.
C. Systematizing AMD Arms Race
Figure 4 displays AMD attack-defense arms race surround-
ing three malware detectors: PDFrate, Drebin, and DNN-
based detector. For a better visual effect, we group papers
that have a common input (a6, . . . , a9). For example, we
group [32] and [100] together because the defenders in both
papers have input (a6, . . . , a9) = (1, 1, 1, 0), while noting that
their input on (A1, . . . , A5) may or may not be different. We
also simplify attack and defense inputs while preserving the
critical information when an attack (defense) works for mul-
tiple inputs. For example, (a1, . . . , a5) = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0) is the
critical information for attack input (a1, · · · , a5|A6, · · · , A9) =
(0, 0, 1, 0, 0|M,X ,OE2,XM) ∨ (0, 0, 1, 0, 1|M,X ,OE2,XM) ∨
(1, 0, 1, 0, 0|M,X ,OE2,XM)∨ (1, 0, 1, 0, 1|M,X ,OE2,XM) be-
cause it is the weakest attack input in the partial order for-
mulated by these (a1, . . . , a5)’s. This suggests us to focus on
attack input (0, 0, 1, 0, 0|M,X ,OE2,XM) because it is already
able to break some defense and automatically implies that
a stronger input can of course achieve the same. Multiple
defense inputs are simplified in the same manner.
Arms Race Surrounding PDF Malware Detector. PDFrate
caused two sequences of escalations. In one sequence, PDFrate
is defeated by [29], which triggers defense escalation to [69];
[69] triggers attack escalation to [97], which can evade [69];
[97] triggers defense escalation to [124], which is a state-
of-the-art enhancement of PDFrate. In the other sequence,
PDFrate is defeated by [41], which triggers defense escalation
to [42] and [122]; the escalated defense in [42] can be defeated
by the escalated attack presented in the very same paper [42];
[122] is another state-of-the-art enhancement to PDFrate.
Arms Race Surrounding Android Malware Detector.
Drebin is defeated by [36], which also proposes new defense
that can defeat the escalated attack; the escalated defense in
[36] triggers the attack escalation to [78], which can defeat the
escalated defense in [36]; the escalated attack in [78] triggers
an escalated defense presented in the very same paper [78],
which remains the state-of-the-art enhancement to Drebin.
Arms Race Surrounding DNN-based Malware Detector.
The DNN-based detector [32] triggers an escalated attack in
[33], which triggers the defense escalation in [136]; [136] is
the state-of-the-art monotonic DNN-based detector.
Independent Arms Race. There are studies that have yet
to trigger cascading arms races, including: (i) Studies [38],
[37], [100], [39] propose independent attacks and then show
how to defeat these attacks. (ii) Studies [104], [98], [99],
[101], [102], [75], [103], [82] propose attacks to defeat naive
malware detectors. (iii) Studies propose defenses to counter
some attacks [121], [44], [79], [125].
IV. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS (FRDS)
FRD 1: Pinning down the root cause(s) of adversarial
malware examples. Speculations on root cause(s) include:
(i) invalidity of the IID assumption because of distribution
drifting, namely that testing files and training files are drawn
from different distributions [28], [137], [70]); (ii) incompe-
tent feature extraction [41], [36]; (iii) high dimensionality of
malware representations [134]; (iv) insufficient training data
[138]; (v) low-probability “pockets” in data manifolds [31];
(vi) linearity of DNNs [115]; and (vii) large curvature of
decision boundaries [139], [140].
FRD 2: Characterizing the relationship between transferabil-
ity and vulnerability. In AMD context, an attacker may use
a surrogate model to generate adversarial examples and a
defender may use a surrogate model for adversarial training.
Transferability is related to the extent at which knowledge
accommodated by a surrogate model may be the same as,
or similar to, what is accommodated by a target model. The
wide use of surrogate model in AMD suggests a fundamental
connection between transferability and vulnerability.
FRD 3: Quantifying robustness and resilience of malware
detectors. Robustness and resilience of malware detectors
against adversarial examples needs to be quantified, ideally
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Fig. 4: Arms race in AMD attack and defense escalations.
with a provable guarantee. For this purpose, one may adapt
the reduction-based paradigm underlying the provable security
of cryptographic primitives and protocols.
FRD 4: Designing malware detectors with provable robustness
and resilience guarantees. Having understood the root cause(s)
of adversarial examples, characterized the effect of transfer-
ability, and designed metrics for quantifying the robustness and
resilience of malware detectors, practical malware detectors
with provable robustness should be designed.
FRD 5: Forecasting the arms race in malware detection.
Arms race is a fundamental phenomenon inherent to the
cybersecurity domain. In order to effectively defend against
malware, one approach is to deploy proactive defense, which
requires the capability in forecasting the arms race between
malware writers and defenders.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented a framework for systematizing the field
of AMD through the lens of assumptions, attacks, defenses
13
and security properties, which paves the way for precisely
relating attacks and defenses. We have showed how to apply
the framework to systematize the AMD literature, including
the arms race between AMD attacks and defenses. We have
reported deeper insights by using a manual effort and by
applying machine learning for insights learning. We have
discussed a number of future research directions.
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APPENDIX
A. Illustrating the Partial Order Formulated by Black-box vs.
Grey-box vs. White-box Attacks
Figure 5 illustrates how vector (a1, · · · , a5)
formulates a partial order between the widely-
used informal notions of black-box attack, namely
(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0), and white-box attack,
namely (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1); there are many
kinds of grey-box attacks in between. This structure pays the
way for unambiguously comparing attacks.
B. Illustrating the Partial Order Formulated by Black-box vs.
Grey-box vs. White-box Defenses
Figure 6 illustrates how vector (a6, . . . , a9) formulates a
partial order between the widely-used informal notions of
black-box defense (a6, a7, a8, a9) = (0, 0, 0, 0) and white-box
defense (a6, a7, a8, a9) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1); there are many kinds
of grey-box defenses in between. This structure pays the way
for unambiguously comparing defenses.
C. The Drebin Android Malware Detector
Drebin is an Android malware detector learned from static
features [20]. Table V summarizes the Drebin feature set
S, which consists of 8 feature subsets, including 4 subsets
S1, S2, S3, S4 of features extracted from AndroidManifest.xml
and 4 subsets S5, S6, S7, S8 of features extracted from the dis-
assembled dexcode. Specifically, S1 contains features related
to the access of an Android package (APK) to smartphone de-
vices (e.g., camera, touchscreen, or GPS module); S2 contains
features related to APK’s requested permissions listed in the
manifest prior to installation; S3 contains features related to
application components (e.g., activities, service, receivers and
etc.); S4 contains features related to APK’s communications
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) White-box attack
(a1, a2, 1, 1, a5)
(a1, a2, a3,
1, a5)
(0, 0, 1,
1, 0)
(a1, a2, 1,
a4, a5)
(a1, a2, 0,
1, a5)
(0, 0, a3,
1, 0)
(a1, a2, a3,
a4, a5)
(0, 0, 1,
a4, 0)
(a1, a2, 1,
0, a5)
(0, 0, 0,
1, 0)
(a1, a2, 0,
a4, a5)
(0, 0, a3,
a4, 0)
(a1, a2, a3,
0, a5)
(0, 0, 1,
0, 0)
(0, 0, 0,
a4, 0)
(a1, a2, 0,
0, a5)
(0, 0, a3,
0, 0)
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0) Black-box attack
Fig. 5: A portion of the partial order defined over (a1, . . . , a5).
(1, 1, 1, 1) White-box defense
(a6, a7, a8, 1)(1, 0, 0, 1)(1, a7, a8, a9)
(0, a7, a8, 1)(a6, 0, 0, 1)(a6, a7, a8, a9)(1, 0, 0, a8)(1, a7, a8, 0)
(0, 0, 0, 1)(0, a7, a8, a9)(a6, 0, 0, a8)(a6, a7, a8, 0)(1, 0, 0, 0)
(0, 0, a9)(0, a7, a8, 0)(a6, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 0, 0) Black-box defense
Fig. 6: A portion of the partial order defined over (a6, . . . , a9).
with the operating system; S5 contains features related to
critical system API calls, which cannot run without appropriate
permissions or the root privilege; S6 contains features corre-
sponding to the used permissions; S7 contains features related
to API calls that can access sensitive data or resources in a
smartphone; and S8 contains features related to IP addresses,
hostnames and URLs found in the disassembled code.
TABLE V: Drebin features
Feature set
Manifest
S1 Hardware components
S2 Requested permissions
S3 App components
S4 Filtered intents
Dexcode
S5 Restricted API calls
S6 Used permissions
S7 Suspicious API calls
S8 Network addresses
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The feature representation is binary, meaning φ : Z 7→
{0, 1}d with |S| = d and x = (x1, . . . , xd), where xi = 1 if
the corresponding feature is present in the APK z and xi = 0
otherwise. A file z in the feature space looks like:
x = φ(z) 7→

· · ·
0
1
· · ·
1
0
· · ·

· · · }
S2
permission::SEND_SMS
permission::READ_CONTACTS
· · · }
S5
api_call::getDeviceID
api_call::setWifiEnabled
· · ·
Drebin uses a linear SVM [141] to learn a classification.
The linear discriminant function is generally expressed as F =
w>x + b where w is the weight vector and b is the bias. It
uses the hinge loss function to tune parameters w and b [142].
D. The MalConv Windows Malware Detector
MalConv [25] is CNN-based Windows malware detector
learned from raw binary programs (i.e., end-to-end) [143]. Fig-
ure 7 exhibits its architecture. At the input layer, the sequence
of binary code is transformed into byte value (between 0 to
255). The length of the input is bounded by m (e.g., m = 221
bytes or 2MB). Each byte is further mapped into a real-valued
vector using embedding [144]. The CNN layer and pooling
layer aim to learn high-level representations.
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